



BUMUN/IV

UNSC



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Letters from the Presidents

Letter by President Barros

Dear delegates,

It is an honor for me to be your president and accompany each and every one of you in this fourth edition of BUMUN, in which each of you will assume the role of a member of the United Nations Security Council. Throughout the development of the committee, you will face scenarios that will demand strategic analysis, decision-making, and a deep examination of common worldwide interests.

This committee will require more than just theoretical preparation. You'll need to follow the debate in real time, anticipate developments, and understand when to speak up and when to negotiate. In my experience with Model United Nations, I've seen that the difference between an average delegate and a truly influential one isn't how much they speak, but how well they understand the moment in which they choose to do so.

I am expecting a dynamic development of the debate as is hoped for in this committee, in which ideas are not just said but done, in which you have the opportunity to construct questions and, most importantly, take a role in the debate, and take advantage of the opportunity and seek to become a better delegate.

WhatsApp: +57 3045719007

E-mail: edgar.barros-quintero@cbsm.edu.co

Letter from President Carreño

Welcome, delegates.

My name is Reik Carreño, and I have the honor of being selected as President of the Security Council for this edition of BUMUN, in which it will be my second time presiding in this model. It fills me with pride to see how this MUN continues to grow, becoming an actively evolving space to debate ideas, collaborate with others, understand the current global challenges, and develop useful solutions for society and the future.

In this edition of the Security Council, you will discuss how to address the flow and proliferation of illicit arms trafficking in post-collapse states, using the availability of illegal weapons following the collapse of Libya as a case study and studying its impact on the region's stability. We will also debate on the expansion of terrorist and extremist groups in fragile states, focusing on the resurgence of Islamic State affiliates in the Sahel and West Africa.

I encourage you to use this opportunity to increase your understanding of these relevant and influential issues. Prepare with dedication, thoroughly research your given country's position down to the smallest detail, and warm up your critical thinking skills, as they will be valuable throughout this committee.

I am confident that this committee will serve as an environment in which all you can shine, contribute to the debate, and contribute to build an unforgettable experience filled with valuable discussions and new learning opportunities.

I wish you success in your preparation. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me through the following ways:

WhatsApp: +57 3222566906

E-mail: reikcarreno@colegiobureche.edu.co

Introduction to the Committee

The Security Council, or UNSC, is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations created in 1945. It is charged with maintaining international peace, security, and dealing with all international issues and situations that may threaten these aspects among the global community.

The UNSC has certain capabilities, which include the ability to authorize military action to address threats to peace, impose sanctions to compel countries or groups to comply with international law, and establish peacekeeping missions to stabilize areas of conflict.

Structured uniquely, the UNSC is composed of 15 member states, each of which has one vote. The 15 member states are composed of 5 permanent members: the People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, and 10 non-permanent members elected at the General Assembly for two-year terms. According to the UN Charter, all member states must comply with the decisions made within the Security Council. Decisions taken require a 9/15 vote of the member states; however, if a decision is vetoed by a permanent member state, the resolution will be blocked and will not be implemented. All permanent members have the power to veto a resolution. All 15 member states have the ability to abstain from voting; however, the 9 affirmative votes required to pass a resolution are not affected by abstention.

The UNSC has been and continues to be an essential part of international cooperation, and its adaptive capabilities are essential to addressing matters that may threaten global security. Its role in the international community is incredibly important, and its resolutions can have major effects on global security.

Topic A: Addressing the Flow and Proliferation of Illicit Arms Trafficking in States

Post-Collapse **Case Study:** The Spread of Illicit Weapons Following the Collapse of Libya and its Impact on Regional Stability

Topic Overview

When a state collapses, it often ends up creating security breaches that enable the rapid spread of illicit weapons. This, mixed with governments losing control over their borders, military stockpiles, firearms, and other types of weapons, may end up being diverted into illegal markets, giving strength to armed groups, criminal organizations, or insurgents. Instead of being a local problem that can be contained, arms trafficking usually extends

rapidly across borders, instigating not only national but also regional instability, prolonging conflicts, and sabotaging peacebuilding efforts.

Libya's collapse in 2011 illustrates the reality of how unsecured weapon stock can circulate through neighboring countries, strengthening independent actors that are not regulated by the state and intensifying violence across the Sahel and North Africa. To address such a challenge, it is necessary to balance immediate security concerns with long-term strategies that strengthen state institutions, improve border management, allow better international cooperation, and promote the effective implementation of already existing firearms control frameworks. As this issue stays in constant evolution, the Security Council must evaluate how multilateral action can reduce the flow of illicit weapons while bringing support and stability to post-collapse states.

Historical Context

When a government collapses, weapons usually spread because of the political instability this creates. Armed conflict and the weakening of security institutions become more common too. Governments usually lose control of their territory and may also lose control of their military bases, weapon storage facilities, and national borders. As a result, weapons can be stolen, sold, or transferred to armed groups, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups.

One of the clearest examples of this problem can be seen in Libya. In October 2011, a NATO-backed conflict led to the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's government. This is exactly the case study that we will use here for the Security Council Committee. Over four decades, Gaddafi amassed one of the largest arsenals in the region, including small arms, light

weapons, heavy artillery, and an estimated 20,000 Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS). After his government collapsed, Libya entered a period of political instability. Without a unified military, armories across major cities like Tripoli, Benghazi, Sabha, and Misrata were systematically looted by rebel factions, localized militias, and criminal networks taking advantage of the central government.

Many of the weapons that spread after the collapse of Libya did not remain inside the country. They were transported across desert borders and reached other countries in North Africa, the Sahel, the Levant, and Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically Mali, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and the Gaza Strip. Some of these weapons were later used by armed groups and extremist organizations to match the firepower of state militaries. This showed that the collapse of a country can create severe security problems for an entire region. The international community responded by creating measures such as arms embargoes under UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) and systems to monitor illegal weapons transfers. However, enforcing these measures has been difficult because of the political divisions that the country is currently going through, combined with the presence of powerful armed groups controlling key infrastructure.

Issue

The case of Libya is important because it shows that illegal arms trafficking is not only caused by the illegal sale of weapons. It can also begin when a country loses control of its institutions and military stockpiles. Therefore, preventing the spread of weapons requires both strong arms-control measures (like the Arms Trade Treaty and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms) and the rebuilding of stable government institutions with effective authorities capable of securing weapons and controlling borders. Without these authorities, illegal weapons can continue to move between countries and increase regional instability.

Illegal weapons may also cross national borders. In many regions, especially within areas of large deserts like the Sahara, governments have a difficult time monitoring every border

crossing. Smugglers constantly use these areas to move advanced weaponry, including MANPADS, anti-tank missiles, and heavy machine guns, between countries. Criminal organizations, rebel groups, and terrorist organizations also use them to create and connect networks to obtain weapons, lowering their cost to enter into conflict.

Arms trafficking is also connected to other types of illegal activities. The same networks that transport weapons are also usually involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, or the illegal exploitation of natural resources like gold and oil. This makes the problem more difficult, since armed groups use these trafficking profits to create shadow economies that give them financial incentives to maintain state fragility and resist stabilization.

The international community faces several challenges when trying to solve this situation. Arms embargoes can be difficult to enforce without a functioning host state to conduct border checks and end-user verification. It can also be incredibly complex to identify who is responsible for these illegal transfers. In addition, helping a legitimate government obtain weapons for security purposes can create risks if those weapons are later stolen or transferred to unauthorized groups.

To resolve these problems, countries can improve physical stockpile management (PSSM) in weapons storage facilities, mark and track weapons, cooperate to control borders, share intelligence, and punish organizations involved in illegal arms trafficking. However, these measures are not enough by themselves. Long-term solutions will probably require political stability and stronger institutions. The example of Libya shows that controlling weapons is closely connected to rebuilding a country after its collapse.

Current Situation

Illegal arms trafficking continues to evolve into a bigger and more serious problem in Libya and in other countries affected by political instability and weak governance. Libya continues to face political divisions between rival authorities and the presence of different powerful armed groups. Because of this, the central government has faced difficulties controlling the entire country, securing weapons, and protecting its borders.

The international community has created measures to limit the transfer of weapons to Libya. Although these measures include an arms embargo and monitoring operations, such as the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) inspecting maritime vessels, the existence of an arms embargo does not automatically stop illegal weapons from

entering or leaving the country. Its success depends heavily on countries cooperating with each other and monitoring land, air, and sea routes. In a vast desert region where cooperation is difficult and trafficking has adapted into decentralized micro-trafficking networks, this can become a difficult task.

Another important problem is the relationship between armed groups and government institutions. In countries where different groups control different areas, it becomes difficult to determine who has clear authority over weapons and security forces. This makes it easier for weapons to disappear from official storage facilities or to be transferred without proper authorization.

The effects of illegal arms trafficking also continue to grow and affect neighboring countries. In the Sahel region, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, illegal weapons originating from Libyan stockpiles have contributed to ongoing conflicts involving armed groups, criminal organizations, and extremist groups. Furthermore, modern proliferation now includes modified weapons, digital procurement, and commercial off-the-shelf technology like drones. This demonstrates that arms trafficking is not only a national problem but can also be a regional and international security threat.

The Security Council must therefore consider how existing arms-control measures can be made more effective. Delegates will discuss whether better tracing databases (managed by INTERPOL and UNODC), stronger cooperation between countries, improved border security, and investigations into organizations that violate arms restrictions should be

considered as possible solutions to this problem. At the same time, the international community must consider how to help legitimate governments improve their security forces without allowing more weapons to enter illegal markets.

International Efforts

Measures have been implemented to help limit the illicit flows of trafficked weapons in failed states. A major power helping to prevent illicit arms flow in Libya was the UN Security Council. Through its resolution 1970 of 2011, the council implemented an arms embargo. The goal was to help ensure that weapons and military equipment cannot fall into the hands of those who might further fuel the conflict or contribute to the strength of armed groups in Libya. The Security Council also appointed a sanctions committee and created a panel of experts to look into potential violations of the embargo and monitor arms movement. Illicit weapons can also move between countries. Governments have a difficult time trying to monitor every crossing along their borders. Smugglers take advantage of remote areas that span large deserts or other difficult terrain to traffic weapons into other countries. Organized crime groups, rebel groups, and terrorist groups can also take advantage of them to build and

connect networks to acquire weapons. Weapons trafficking is often linked to other illicit activity. Networks used to ship these weapons will often engage in other illicit markets like drug trafficking, human trafficking, kidnapping and ransom, or illicit exploitation of natural resources. This further exacerbates the issue as there can be fighting between different criminal groups or even the creation of conflict, causing innocent casualties. There are many difficulties that the global community faces when attempting to prevent the illicit arms trade. Arms embargoes can become weak if states or organizations find other outlets to provide weapons. It can be difficult to determine who is exactly responsible for the illegal shipment of weapons. Furthermore, when providing arms to a legitimate government for security purposes, there is a risk that these weapons can fall into the hands of others. If they are stolen or sold to unauthorized groups, they can be used for the opposite effect. Countries can help fix these issues by increasing security on weapons storage facilities, marking and tracing weapons, cooperating to better monitor borders, sharing intelligence, and sanctioning organizations that help traffic weapons illegally. These are just steps to help limit the issue, but lasting solutions will likely require a stable political climate and stronger institutions. As we have seen with Libya, arms control is linked to state building after a state has failed.

Perspectives

Block 1: Western States

(United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy)

- The West strongly emphasizes enforcement of the UN arms embargo.
- In favor of imposing sanctions on arms traffickers, rebel groups, etc. along with states that do not comply with embargoes.
- In favor of improving maritime and border monitoring capabilities.
- In support of capacity building and institution building within fragile states.

Block 2: Regional States + Africa

(Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Chad, Niger, Mali)

- Give importance to illicit weapons flow that affect neighboring countries.
- Want international assistance to promote border security and crackdown on trafficking.
- Emphasis on respecting national sovereignty.
- Want neighboring countries and African Union to work with governments to promote regional cooperation.

Block 3: Russia, China & Int. Organizations

(Russia, China, United Nations, African Union, European Union)

- In favor of international action against illicit arms trafficking, WITH respect to state sovereignty.
- Prefer dealing with problems through state governments rather than external military forces.
- Support UN monitors, capacity building, and regional cooperation.
- Want more focus on multilateral dialogue and less coercive measures.

Guiding Questions

1. What are the main factors that boost the spread of illicit weapons after a state collapses?
2. How does the collapse of government institutions play a role in the security and control of military weapons stockpiles?
3. How does illicit arms trafficking transmit its effects to neighboring countries and regional stability?
4. What role do criminal organizations and armed groups play in illicit weapon trafficking across borders?

5. What challenges do governments and international organizations face when they try to enforce arms embargoes?

QARMAS

1. How can the Security Council ensure the arms embargo on Libya is better enforced without impacting humanitarian assistance or legitimate security support?
2. How can the international community better secure weapons stored in military stockpiles from reaching armed groups, terrorist organizations, and transnational crime networks?
3. How can the international community strengthen border security to better monitor illicit movement of weapons through fragile states and neighbouring countries?
4. How can the Security Council bolster international co-operation and intelligence sharing to better identify organizations that facilitate illicit arms shipments?
5. How can the international community work to reinforce fragile state institutions in the long-term to prevent the collapse of government authority from further exacerbating arms proliferation and regional conflict?

Topic B: Addressing the Expansion of Terrorist and Extremist Groups in Fragile States

Case Study: The resurgence of Islamic State affiliates in the Sahel and West Africa.

Topic Overview

Fragile and weak states usually become the stages in which both terrorist and extremist organizations become stronger and build connections to exploit more deeply the local government's flaws. Institutional weakness and limited resources give these groups the perfect chance to deepen their roots across different areas, such as the government itself, the population, and businesses, consolidating their influence even more. A perfect example of this is the resurgence of Islamic State affiliates in the Sahel region and West Africa, including organizations such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Both of which have increased their attack on the civilian population and army. This aggravates the security and humanitarian crises in the zone. The expansion of these groups showcases that it is not only a security challenge but also a governance, development, and bilateral cooperation one. In this BUMUN Security Council

edition, delegates must analyze the effectiveness of past measures and work actively on planning and implementing new ones that can address past flaws.

Historical Context

The expansion of terrorist groups across the Sahel and West Africa did not begin with the Islamic State. Its origins are linked to decades of weak government, unsolved internal conflicts, poverty, political exclusion, and limited access to state public services. In many rural areas, national governments have struggled to provide security, education, healthcare, and economic opportunities. This absence of effective state authority created an environment in which armed groups could gradually establish influence.

A major turning point came after the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi's government in Libya in 2011. The fall of the Libyan state released large amounts of weapons into regional trafficking and networking; some of these weapons and inhabitants later reached most of West Africa. The crisis in northern Mali in 2012 showed how quickly local rebellions, criminal networks,

and jihadist organizations could overlap. Although, these groups did not always share the same political disorder and lack of state control.

The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria after 2014 also influenced the region. Its international propaganda encouraged armed organizations in Africa to expand as part of a global movement. In northeastern Nigeria, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015. Internal disagreements later divided the organization, leading to the rise of the Islamic State West Africa Province, commonly known as ISWAP. Unlike some earlier Boko Haram Factions, ISWAP often attempted to build support by targeting security forces and presenting itself as an alternative authority in isolated communities.

In the central Sahel, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara expanded its activities across border areas shared by West African Territories were particularly vulnerable because of the vast geography, limited infrastructure, and recurring tensions between communities. Over time, extremist groups became deeply connected to local disputes over land, political representation, trade routes, and access to natural resources.

Regional governments and international partners launched several military responses, including French-led operations, the G5 Sahel Joint Force, Security Council peacekeeping efforts, and national counterterrorism campaigns. These operations weakened some organizations and eliminated several leaders, but they did not remove the political and social conditions that had allowed extremist groups to grow. As a result, the threat continued to evolve rather than disappear.

Issue

The expansion of terrorist and extremist groups in fragile states cannot be understood only as a military problem. These organizations grow where government institutions are weak, public trust is low, and large parts of the population feel abandoned or excluded. In such environments, extremist groups can exploit local frustrations and present themselves as a source of order, protection, employment, or justice. Recruitment into these organizations is not always driven by religious ideology. Some individuals join because they have few economic alternatives, while others seek protection from rival armed groups or abusive security forces. In certain areas, young civilians may receive government aid in exchange for cooperation. Local grievances can be equally influential. Disputes between isolated groups and unequal political representation may all be manipulated by extremist organizations.

Islamic State affiliates also attempt to control territory without necessarily governing it in the same way as a conventional state. They may collect taxes, regulate local trade, punish criminal behavior control roads, or impose their own judicial systems. In regions where formal institutions are absent, some residents may cooperate with them out of fear or necessity rather than genuine ideological support.

The humanitarian impact is severe. Attacks on villages, schools, religious centers, and markets prevent humanitarian organizations from reaching vulnerable communities. Displacement can then create further instability, since host communities must absorb large numbers of people while already facing limited resources.

The geography of the Sahel makes the problem more difficult to contain. Borders are long, lightly monitored, and often cross deserts or isolated rural areas. Fighters, weapons, and other resources can move between countries more easily than national security forces. A group of pressure in one country may simply relocate to another.

Counterterrorism operations can also worsen the situation when they are poorly conducted. Civilian casualties, arbitrary arrests, corruption and allegations of abuse can damage public confidence in the government. Extremist organizations use these incidents in their propaganda, claiming that the state does not protect or respect local communities.

For this reason, the challenge is broader than defeating armed groups on the battlefield; it involves restoring government legitimacy, improving security, creating economic opportunities, reducing corruption, resolving local conflicts, and protecting civilians. Without progress in these areas, military victories are likely to remain temporary.

Current Situation

Islamic State affiliates remain active across the Sahel and West Africa, although their strength and territorial influence vary from one country to another. The Islamic State West Africa province continues to operate mainly around the Lake Chad Basin, including northeastern Nigeria and areas near Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. In the central Sahel, Islamic state-linked fighters remain present in western African regions where they compete with government forces and other jihadist organizations.

The regional political environment has become more unstable in recent years. Military coups in Western African regions changed national security strategies and weakened cooperation

with some traditional international partners. The withdrawal or reduction of several foreign military missions created gaps in intelligence, logistics, training and aerial support. At the same time, national governments increased their reliance on domestic armed forces and alternative security partnerships.

This shift has not produced a clear improvement in the overall security situation. In many rural areas, extremist organizations continue to attack military bases, ambush security forces, intimidate local authorities, and pressure communities into paying taxes or providing supplies. Some groups have expanded their influence by taking advantage of weakened state control and growing public frustration with political instability.

The humanitarian situation remains serious. Large numbers of people have been displaced while thousands of schools and health facilities have been displaced, while thousands of schools and health centers have closed because of insecurity. Food production has also been affected, especially where farmers cannot safely reach their land. This has increased dependence on humanitarian aid at a time when access to affected areas is becoming more difficult.

Islamic States affiliates have also adapted their methods. They rely on small mobile units, local recruitment, informal taxation, smuggling networks, kidnaping, and the control of trade routes. Their decentralized structure allows them to survive even after senior commanders are killed. They also use digital propaganda and encrypted communication to maintain contact, spread messages, and attract supporters.

The current situation therefore reflects a wider crisis of governance. Extremist groups remain dangerous, but their continued presence is closely linked to weak institutions, limited public services, political instability, and unresolved local tensions. Military action may reduce their operational capacity, but it cannot by itself restore long-term stability. The future of the region will depend largely on whether governments can regain public trust, protect civilians, strengthen local institutions, and cooperate across borders more effectively.

International Efforts

The international community has developed several initiatives to combat the expansion of terrorist and extremist groups in fragile states through security cooperation, capacity-building, and financial oversight. The United Nations has played a central role by adopting resolutions such as 1373 (2001) and 2178 (2014), which require Member States to strengthen border security, prevent terrorist financing, and improve intelligence sharing. At the regional level, the African Union has coordinated joint security efforts and supported counterterrorism strategies across the Sahel, while organizations such as INTERPOL facilitate the exchange of information on suspected terrorists and transnational networks. Additionally, the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) provides technical assistance and training to states with limited institutional capacity, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) works to disrupt the financial networks that sustain extremist

organizations. Although these initiatives have strengthened international cooperation, their effectiveness continues to depend on political stability, institutional capacity, and sustained collaboration among states.

Perspectives

Block 1: Counterterrorism Coalition

(United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy)

- In favor of global counterterrorism cooperation.
- Increase intelligence sharing between nations and sanction finance of terrorism.
- Provide military training and equipment to fragile states.
- Assist in cutting off recruitment of extremists through a global coalition.

Block 2: Fragile States + Region States

(Mali, Niger, Chad, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia)

- Want establishment or return of legitimate state authority.
- Ask for financial backing and logistical support, but don't want to feel like sovereignty is being infringed on.
- Tackle root causes such as poverty, weak governance, and insecurity.
- Strengthen regional organizations such as the African Union and neighboring states.

Block 3: Sovereignty & Multilateralism

(Russia, China, United Nations, African Union)

- AGAINST military interventions.
- In favor of Security Council authorized action with consent from states.
- Increase in capacity building, institution building, and promotion of long term stable environments.
- Political dialogue should be promoted as well.

Guiding Questions

1. What are the principal factors that affect the spread of terrorist and extremist groups in fragile states?
2. How does weak government control play a role in helping the expansion of these terrorist organizations?
3. How does political instability, poverty, and insecurity instigate terrorist recruitment and radicalization?
4. What role do terrorist organizations fulfill in creating further instability in fragile states and neighboring countries?
5. What challenges do governments and international organizations face when trying to combat terrorism while respecting national sovereignty?

QARMAS

1. What measures should be implemented to stop terrorist organizations from recruiting and radicalizing individuals in fragile states?
2. How can the international community improve cooperation to identify and disrupt terrorist organizations?
3. What programs should be established to address the background causes of terrorism, including poverty, weak governance, political instability, and insecurity?
4. How can the Security Council support fragile states in strengthening their security institutions and preventing terrorist groups from gaining control over national territory?
5. How can the Security Council strengthen counterterrorism efforts in fragile states without interfering with their national sovereignty?

Glossary

1. Arms: Weapons, especially those used by military forces such as the army or navy.

(Oxford University Press, n.d.)

2. Armament: Weapons such as guns, bombs, tanks, and other military equipment. (Oxford

University Press, n.d.)

3. Arms Trafficking: The illegal trade of weapons, especially when weapons are moved from one place to another. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment, n.d.)

4. Arms Trafficker: A person who illegally trades weapons, especially when this involves moving them from one place to another. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment, n.d.)

5. Embargo: An official order that prohibits or restricts trade with another country. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

6. Disarmament: The reduction of a country's armed forces or the number of weapons it possesses. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

7. Smuggling: The illegal activity of secretly taking goods into or out of a country. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment, n.d.)

8. Black Market: An illegal system of buying and selling goods or services. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

9. Ammunition: Materials such as bullets, shells, and bombs used as weapons. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

10. Militia: A military force made up of ordinary people that is separate from a country's regular armed forces. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

11. Insurgent: A person who fights against a government or established authority. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

12. Terrorism: The use of violence for political purposes or to force a government or organization to act in a certain way. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

13. Terrorist: A person who uses or supports violence for political purposes. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

14. Extremism: The holding of extreme political or social ideas. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

15. Radicalization: The process through which a person develops increasingly extreme political or social beliefs. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

16. Conflict: A serious disagreement, struggle, or fight between people, groups, or countries. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

17. Instability: A condition in which something is not stable and is likely to change or fail. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

18. Governance: The activity or process of controlling and managing a country, organization, or system. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

19. Sovereignty: The right and power of a country to govern itself and make its own laws and decisions. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

20. Sanctions: Official measures taken against a country, organization, or individual to pressure them to change their behavior. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

21. Proliferation: A rapid increase or spread of something. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

22. Stockpile: A large quantity of something stored for future use. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

23. Armed Group: A group of people organized and equipped with weapons, usually for military or political purposes. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment, n.d.)

24. Insurgency: An organized attempt by a group of people to take control of a country or area through fighting. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

25. Terrorist Organization: An organized group that uses or supports terrorism to achieve political or ideological objectives. (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

26. State Collapse: The breakdown of a state's ability to effectively govern its territory and maintain its institutions. Political science concept.

27. Fragile State: A state whose government and institutions have limited capacity to maintain stability, provide security, and effectively govern its territory. International relations concept.



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